Super Testnet

Open source dev w/ bitcoin focus | supertestnet.org

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Last Notes

2026-02-01 20:28:28 UTC

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I don't think you believe the former
As for the latter, it seems like a complete concession that rate limits do apply

2026-02-01 19:25:01 UTC

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> No APIs. No rate limits
Nostr relays have apis, that's what most of the nips are. And all relays I know of have rate limits too

2026-01-31 02:15:37 UTC

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> we have lightning payments but there is no privacy
I can't agree with a statement like "lightning payments have no privacy." Lightning provides a pretty strong baseline for privacy. It's not perfect (it's not even good, absolutely speaking), but it's not nothing, and if used carefully (e.g. if you run your own lightning node on tor and learn how to manage channels) I think it's better than alternative solutions such as monero. Still, lots of work to do, and I'm glad it's being done.

2026-01-30 18:09:40 UTC

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Running whatever version you want is exactly what the loud noises are all about

2026-01-30 18:08:07 UTC

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Zaps face a different privacy challenge: the protocol requires the sender and the recipient to identify themselves and the amount sent, and publish that info for all to see in a "zap receipt." It is possible to use zap infrastructure to send someone money without publishing a zap receipt, and this would help privacy conscious people, but I don't think anyone has built an app for that.

2026-01-30 01:10:22 UTC

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he has been near bitcoin since 2010 so what does that make bitcoin?

2026-01-30 00:30:01 UTC

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if you're running Zeus and not running a full node then you're trusting whoever *is* running a full node. In Zeus's case, this means you're trusting the nodes your Zeus wallet reaches out to for bip157 filters.

2026-01-30 00:07:44 UTC

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I guess bitcoin can't be good then

2026-01-30 00:06:48 UTC

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> Will the big nodes execute it? How do we know they're executing it? Are we turning privacy into a matter of faith?
I think this gets really interesting if/when routing nodes start publishing privacy policies, e.g. "we do not log payments." Then you can start to build routes that *do* have some cryptographic guarantees. E.g. "if I route my payment through N nodes with zero-log policies, then even if only 1 is honest, an attacker gets subpoenas records from every node on my route *still* won't find full records of my payment."
Many cryptographic protocol rely on assumptions like that one. Tor works like this and Dandelion++ works like this, for example. Lightning has always had privacy assumptions that work best when routing nodes don't collude together, but these assumptions are undermined if attackers can easily access node logs and thus effectively *force* them to collude after-the-fact. If every node has the ability to easily delete logs, that makes lightning's privacy assumptions stronger, because it makes it more likely that an attacker who tries to acquire those logs won't be able to get them.

2026-01-29 19:32:53 UTC

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https://image.nostr.build/49b32cf0ec9e2c324bf0c3ca6071d89f197dc3938aae2e1cea1896306a9f019d.jpg

2026-01-29 19:08:44 UTC

Goofus and Gallant
https://image.nostr.build/6c7c4fb402f9680384baad4ece62d900a4f10938ec63cb8b756b48c406a50a1d.png

2026-01-29 16:13:22 UTC

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On a related note: #nevent1q…7swu

2026-01-29 15:58:04 UTC

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Yes, there is still work to do. The docs mention the possibility of adding "Automatic Scheduled Deletion" as an enhancement. I hope they do, and I hope they turn it on automatically.
There's another enhancement that I hope to bring up after the DeleteFwdHistory command goes live (one thing at a time): besides forwarding logs, LND has two other log files, "normal" logs and "revocation" logs, and whenever a payment gets logged in the forwarding logs, those *other* logs *also* get an entry containing similar information.
But the new command does not delete records from those other log files, it only deletes records from the forwarding logs. So even after DeleteFwdHistory goes live, an attacker who gains access to your node could still reconstruct past payment flows even if you ran DeleteFwdHistory on a regular basis.
The docs mention two mitigations for this: you can set up automated systems to manually purge your normal logs, or tell LND not to keep normal logs at all. That can be used in conjunction with DeleteFwdHistory to delete 2/3s of the sensitive records about forwarding history.
But that doesn't fix the problem with revocation logs. LND doesn't let you easily delete those log files because they contain information that it "needs" in order to safely perform force closures if needed. The docs only mention one solution for deleting sensitive information from those logs, and it's a pretty nasty one: if you close any channel, that channel's revocation logs automatically get deleted.
A node operator with a 90 day retention policy (for example) could schedule their computer to run DeleteFwdHistory every 90 days (which would solve 1/3 of the problem) and tell their node not to keep normal logs (which would solve an additional 1/3 of the problem). To delete the last 1/3 of the logs (the revocation logs), the node operator could schedule their computer to close each channel in their node 90 days after it is created. But that would make such nodes less competitive, as channel closures cost money, and they'd have to pass on those costs to their users.
So after the DeleteFwdHistory command goes live I plan to ask them to "enhance it" so that it *also* deletes sensitive info from the revocation logs. The revocation logs do not need to retain "all" info about past payments; they need to keep something called a "revocation key" and they need to watch for a certain transaction id to appear on the blockchain (or in the mempool). The DeleteFwdHistory command could safely delete all other data in old revocation logs, and then node operators would no longer need to close any channels in order to automatically delete all of the sensitive information from their old records.
But one thing at a time! I'm glad the new feature is almost ready and I'll wait til it goes live before I request this enhancement.

2026-01-29 15:19:45 UTC

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I ran those first 6 paragraphs through Grok and asked it to rewrite them in simpler terms. I think it did a good job, so I copied the result here:
https://telegra.ph/Grok-Explains-Forwarding-History-01-29

2026-01-29 15:12:52 UTC

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I thought the first 6 paragraphs of the new docs were easy to understand. Did you try reading those?
https://github.com/Roasbeef/lnd/blob/017299fe6f3aec3d8c7ece84c383a47da59862f0/docs/forwarding_history_privacy.md

2026-01-28 21:22:41 UTC

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This feature is expected in the v0.21 release of LND, which itself is expected around April 2026
Note this advisory for any node runners who want to use the new feature:
What Deletion Doesn't Protect
The revocation log for active channels contains information that can be used to reconstruct transaction flows. Once channels are closed, this data is automatically deleted.
The normal logs of a node also contain information that can be used to correlate transactions. Users can set up automated systems to manually purge logs, or configure the logging directory to a purely in-memory file system.
-----
End of advisory.

2026-01-28 21:00:09 UTC

Good news for lightning privacy:
LND has new docs describing a forthcoming feature called "deletefwdinghistory" which purges your node's historical transaction logs
Much requested by me, Peter Todd, and others
Give it a read and thank the devs!
https://github.com/Roasbeef/lnd/blob/017299fe6f3aec3d8c7ece84c383a47da59862f0/docs/forwarding_history_privacy.md

2026-01-28 17:08:22 UTC

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Diary of a Wimpy Kid 2010
Haven't seen it so I don't know if it's any good but this 30 second clip is funny

2026-01-28 13:33:11 UTC

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when I see a good one I post it (well, except I'm often not thinking about this particular issue, so I don't always make the requisite association)

2026-01-28 12:59:25 UTC

Bitcoin Implementations
https://video.nostr.build/6d6e4e40c2f6f5cd6b3b7ea7c17dd3ccf5a88a127343795afaa4c91ded28fab8.mp4

2026-01-27 00:28:20 UTC

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In the end, the prompters become the prompted
Maybe you could write another agent to answer their questions on your behalf

2026-01-26 22:17:38 UTC

Second BTC announces support for a new variant of Ark called Hark:
https://docs.second.tech/changelog/changelog/
I'm a big fan of providing users with options, and it looks like Hark is opt-in, so I'm a fan. However, I think it sadly doesn't count as a layer 2 protocol. Here's why:
Hark is designed for users who don't want to run Ark's interactive signing protocol. Therefore, such users will not have a unilateral exit even in the best case. Ark has a single-honest-party trust assumption, and it was designed so that anyone can "be" one of those parties by (1) onboarding and (2) running the interactive signing protocol—which means you are one of the parties in the single-honest-party trust assumption, and are thus trusting *yourself* to be honest.
But Hark users opt *not* to run the interactive signing protocol. As a result, they cannot be one of the parties in Ark's single-honest-party trust assumption, so they must trust someone who *is* one of those parties.
At least to me, that means, sadly, Hark is not a real layer 2 of bitcoin. My definition of a layer 2 requires the availability of a unilateral exit. Ark is a layer 2 only for users who run the interactive signing protocol and do refreshes as needed. In Hark, you don't run the interactive signing protocol, so you're essentially trusting a federation to sign transactions on your behalf without stealing from you, and that makes it not a layer 2 (by my definition).

2026-01-24 20:01:29 UTC

My latest essay is not about bitcoin, it's about hot air balloons, airships, and the surprising story of 5 companies in the 1800s that tried to launch commercial airline ventures before airplanes existed
Timeline of Commercial Air Traffic in the 1800s:
#nevent1q…7d6x

2026-01-24 19:50:32 UTC

Timeline of Commercial Air Traffic in the 1800s
In the 1800s, 5 private corporations launched ventures to transport goods and passengers between cities on hot air balloons, airships, and airplanes. (One of the ones below technically didn’t, but I think what they *did* do is close enough to count.) Here is a timeline:
In 1843, the Aerial Transit Company was a British corporation that sought investor funding to build an airplane for transporting goods and passengers between cities. However, their science was bad, and they were widely mocked. They did not receive sufficient funding to build their airplane, which wouldn’t have worked anyway without serious design modifications, as no one really knew how to build airplanes yet. Some scientists at that time were not even sure it was possible. The company went bankrupt, and the venture was not revived.
In 1859, the United States Express Company was a package delivery corporation that once hired hot air balloonist John Wise for an experiment to test the feasibility of transporting packages between cities by air. The test flight carried real, commercial packages, meant for shipment from Missouri to customers in New York, and it was also meant to test if a balloon could travel the kinds of distances required for transatlantic flights. Mr. Wise dreamed of a company specializing in cross-oceanic transport, and the United States Express Company was one of his chief sponsors (perhaps hoping one day to *be* a trans-oceanic transport company). Sadly, during the flight, in an effort to avoid crashing, Wise decided he must jettison the commercial packages as if they were ballast. The company decided not to pursue further tests, though the venture was somewhat revived in 1873; keep reading for more on that later.
In 1863, the Aerial Navigation Company was an American corporation founded by an airship pioneer named Solomon Andrews. I think he is praiseworthy for this thing, among others: he built his airship *before* founding this company, pitched investors on his “big idea” *after* demonstrating to their satisfaction that his machine worked, and only *then* received funding from them. His big idea was (as with prior attempts on this timeline) to use the airship in a commercial enterprise involving the transport of goods and passengers between cities, with profits to be shared with the investors. The company used the investors’ money to build a new aircraft and then they made several successful test flights in 1866, but before they did any *commercial* flights, the bank holding their money collapsed, and the company filed for bankruptcy. The venture was not revived.
In 1873, the Daily Graphic was an American newspaper which, after a pitch by balloonist and entrepreneur Washington Donaldson, attempted to revive John Wise’s transatlantic transport idea by sponsoring the construction of a hot air balloon meant to be employed by Mr. Donaldson in transporting goods and passengers from America to Europe for profit. Mr. Wise was allegedly consulted on the project since he had previous experience trying to do this with the United States Express Company as his sponsor. The newspaper expected to benefit from this venture through enhanced publicity for their newspaper, e.g. the first balloon in Mr. Donaldson’s fleet was named after them (his "fleet" never had more than this one balloon), and they had a deal to get a scoop about its maiden voyage. Sadly, the balloon was torn during a test; after repairs, a test flight commenced, where the balloon flew 60 miles before it crashed and was destroyed. The venture was not revived, partly because Mr. Donaldson died in a crash while attempting another long-distance flight in 1875; this time the operation was sponsored by the P.T. Barnum circus, and was not intended to test the feasibility of a long-distance flight company; it was a daredevil act to attract publicity for the circus.
In 1898, the Society for the Promotion of Airship Flight was a German corporation founded by entrepreneur Ferdinand von Zeppelin to seek investor funds and then build the first Zeppelin airship. It worked, leading to Mr. Zeppelin receiving more financing for further efforts, so he built more airships. A few years later (i.e. in the early 1900s), after more designs and tests, he founded the Zeppelin company to use his airships for commercial transport of goods and passengers around Europe and eventually across the world – as well as for military usage. The Zeppelin company is widely regarded as the first airline company, and this timeline is partly intended to show that they were *actually* the first *successful* airline company. Four others preceded them but without the Zeppelin company’s smashing success.
Also noteworthy: there were 2 government-sponsored “quasi corporations” – the French Postal Service and the US Postal Service – which successfully contracted with balloonists several times in the 1800s to experiment with delivering real, commercial mail between cities via balloons. These tests were mostly publicity stunts meant to draw crowds who sent needless postcards and such with expensive balloon stamps, and they happened in 1859 (in America), 1870 (in France), and 1877 (in America again). Arguably, such a test even happened in 1793, when President George Washington gave a balloonist a document greeting the owner of whatever land the balloonist would happen to land on. The document was arguably a type of mail, so some say *that* counts as an early example of balloon airmail too, though it’s somewhat different since the document’s intended recipient wasn’t exactly known in advance, and so there was no specific delivery address.
Anyway, these experiments demonstrated the commercial potential of air traffic, as most of the tests were not failures, had paying customers, and sometimes got the mail to its destination faster and cheaper than alternative methods. Nonetheless, the Postal Services did not think balloonists saved them enough time or money to justify contracting their services regularly. Especially when some of the tests *did* experience failures and thus risked further damaging each Postal Service’s already imperfect reputation for reliability.
Also noteworthy: many balloonists formed “informal” commercial ventures throughout the 1800s (and even the late 1700s) where people paid them for individual flights in their balloons, especially at circuses and carnivals. These ventures technically count as commercial transport of passengers, and some of them sound like they were part of formal for-profit corporate entities (like circuses). Moreover, a few people even ventured to contract with such balloonists to charter a flight between two cities, so some people might question why I failed to include such examples in my timeline. The reason is, based on my research, I don’t think these flights counted as transporting customers or freight with an *economic* or even a *vacation-y* interest in quickly getting to another location on a regular schedule. The passengers mostly just wanted to break records and get a thrill from the very act of flying a long distance (or, at circuses and such, a rather short distance).
That’s important too, but in this timeline I wanted to focus on “business” travel (or even “vacation” travel) rather than flying-for-adreneline’s-sake. I wanted to find ventures that experimented with flights between cities for the purpose of assessing the economic feasibility of doing them on a regular basis for passengers and freight, like modern airlines do. I think the “adreneline-junky” purpose is less interesting, for me, even though companies supplying *that* demand were almost the only ballooning ventures that really succeeded in the 1800s. It is notable that the only venture on my timeline that *was* successful was Mr. Zeppelin’s 1898 company, which had a very limited purpose of just building a functional airship. This success led Mr. Zeppelin to further successes down the road – a reminder that setting a very *attainable* goal can be massively rewarding.
Also noteworthy: several balloonists in the 1800s contracted with various militaries to provide reconnaissance services for a fee. At least one public-private partnership did this: the Union Army Balloon Corps of 1861 was an official military entity, but the pilots were all civilians under private for-profit contracts. I think that technically counts as a commercial venture, at least for the pilots, but the military connection and the absence of any attempt to use balloons to travel between cities makes it not quite what I was looking for when I started this document, so I did not include it in the main timeline.
But I do think it’s really interesting in its own way; e.g. the success of that public-private partnership eventually led to the government (in 1892) creating an official “not-private” division of the military called the Signal Corps Balloon Service, staffed with pilots who were sergeants and colonels and such, rather than ordinary civilians. Through a series of rebrands and mergers, this group eventually became the US Air Force. I find that fact both funny and really cool: in a very real sense, the US Air Force has its organizational origins in a few soldiers who scouted for enemy troops from the high vantage point of a hot air balloon.

2026-01-22 16:55:30 UTC

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The fourth amendment doesn't specify that it only applies to citizens, and perhaps one reason why is, an officer often doesn't immediately know if the person they want to arrest is a citizen or not.
If the law allowed federal officers to enter and search people's homes without a judicial warrant so long as they claim to suspect a non-citizen lives there (and, in fact, the law does effectively allow this), then that loophole would render the fourth amendment's anti-search protections meaningless (as, in fact, the warrant issuance loophole does).

2026-01-22 09:29:25 UTC

Today I read an article about the “warrants” used by some members of the federal government to arrest immigrants: https://edition.cnn.com/2026/01/21/politics/ice-memo-enter-homes-without-judges-warrant
Apparently, federal officials often do not obtain warrants from US courts, but rather have their own commanding officers write documents ordering the arrest of some immigrant or another, and then they “call” these documents warrants. “Administrative warrants” is the term of art, rather than “judicial warrants,” which are the kind one usually thinks of when hearing the term “warrant.” Immediately thinking how this is a sham way to bypass the Constitution, I looked up the text of the fourth amendment, and noticed a loophole I’d never seen before: it does not define what counts as a warrant.
It only mentions warrants in one clause: “no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” That clause does not say who can “issue” a warrant. It seems obvious that the “intent” is a separation of powers – if a federal officer wants to arrest you, he should have to go to a local judge first and get his permission, not just write his own “warrant” and say that counts. Having his own boss in the immigration department write a “warrant” is in many ways just as bad as not getting one at all, and it is sad that the authors of the Constitution seem not to have foreseen this loophole.
Then I wondered, how long have these “administrative warrants” been around? And, sadly, I found out that the answer is, pretty much, “since the country started” – they’ve just gone under different names. So I made this timeline to show how US law has essentially made a mockery of the fourth amendment almost since it was passed.
1791 - the Fourth Amendment is adopted. It says, in full, “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.” The loophole is already in place; it doesn’t define who can issue a warrant; consequently, in principle, anyone can.
1798 - the Naturalization Act of this year says, "[if any] alien...shall refuse or neglect to [report his presence]...any justice of the peace, or other civil magistrate, who has authority to require surety of the peace...[shall] cause such alien to be brought before him, there to give surety of [his] peace and good behaviour...and in failure of such surety, such alien shall and may be committed to the common [jail]." Civil magistrates were sometimes judges, but were also sometimes executive officials, as this law suggests by distinguishing “justices” from “other civil magistrate[s].” This law explicitly says that "any" of them (so long as they have authority to "require surety of the peace") could summon immigrants before them to pay a surety bond. Thus administrative officials could do that. In whatever manner these magistrates "caused" immigrants to come before them, any orders they gave to bring them in constituted a type of warrant, because they did what warrants do: order someone to be detained and potentially brought somewhere. Since such orders could, per the law, be signed (or spoken) by an administrative official rather than by a judge, they constituted administrative warrants.
1875 - the Page Act says, "Every vessel arriving in the United States may be inspected...[to ascertain if] any [forbidden] persons are on board; and the officer making such inspection shall...designat[e] in [a] certificate the person or persons, if any there be, [so] ascertained... [At] no time thereafter shall [such an] alien...be allowed to land...[unless he] shall apply...to any proper court...[and when] a hearing and determination of the matter are had...if the said inspector shall be found [in the right]...the [forbidden] person or persons shall be returned...to the country whence his or her emigration shall have taken place." This law speaks of "certificates" which force the detention of immigrants on ships unless they appeal to a court, and their deportation if the court determined them to be in the country illegally -- or if the immigrant just never asked to see a judge. These certificates were essentially administrative warrants (they did what warrants do, detain and transport someone) but were signed by administrative officials rather than a judge.
1882 - the Chinese Exclusion Act says, "any Chinese person found unlawfully within the United States shall be caused to be removed therefrom...by direction of the President of the United States...after being brought before...a court of the United States." This law explicitly calls for administrative "direction[s]" -- i.e. documents -- that order the detention of a person, their transfer to a court, and then, if found guilty, their deportation. Again, such documents were effectively administrative warrants but were signed, not by a judge, but by the President -- or, in practice, by his agents.
1891 - the Immigration Act of this year says, "inspection officers may order a temporary removal of [some] aliens [to a detention center]...until a thorough inspection is made. ...[Then those] who [arrived] unlawfully...shall, if practicable, be immediately sent back." This law codified the practice of having lower executive officers sign orders for detention and removal, as was already standard since 1875. It also controversially tried to hasten deportation procedures to reduce the amount of cases brought before courts. Orders for final removal were supposed to be executed immediately, without a judge's input, though it was still true that a detained person could *demand* to go to court. If the officials did not ignore them, a judge would see them and at least hear their grounds for appeal. Though, even in that case, some judges might have issued summary judgments in favor of deportation, without a full trial.
1917 - the Immigration Act of this year says, "any alien who...shall be found in the United States in violation of this act...shall, upon the warrant of the Secretary of Labor, be taken into custody and deported." This is the first time a *law* uses the term "warrant" for administrative orders that detained and deported people. Previous laws called such documents "certificates," "direction[s]," and "orders." Other government statements sometimes called them "Secretary's Warrants," but the law did not. This 1917 law turned the common nomenclature into a legal term as well. Since these "warrant[s]" were signed by an executive officer (the Secretary of Labor) rather than a judge, they were not judicial warrants, but administrative ones.
1952 - the Immigration and Nationality Act says, "On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien may be arrested and detained pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States." The Attorney General is, again, an executive officer, not a judge, so these warrants, too, were administrative warrants, not judicial warrants.
1959 - the Supreme Court decides, in Abel v. United States, that "Statutes authorizing administrative arrest...[and] deportation...have the sanction of time...the [presumption of] validity [due to being] Acts of Congress...[and] uncontested historical legitimacy." It calls such documents "administrative arrest warrant[s]" and brings up the question of whether they might be inherently unconstitutional violations of the fourth amendment, since they ordered the seizure of persons without a *judicial* warrant. But the court summarily decided that such orders *were* constitutional by saying they had been in common use for a long time, that the courts must *presume* long-established laws are valid, and that neither side in the present case questioned the constitutionality of such warrants.
In modern times, such “warrants” have been questioned again. The Fourth Amendment says the government isn’t allowed to “seize” (arrest) you without a warrant. What good is this amendment if the executive branch has pretty much always been permitted to seize people and jail them *without* getting a judge’s warrant? Sure, they get an “administrative” warrant, but an administrative warrant just means the very branch of government that wants to arrest you wrote an order telling its own agents to do so. It’s a rubber stamp masquerading as a “real” warrant. And it is sad that U.S. law has essentially always used this “administrative warrant” trick (under a variety of names) to bypass the fourth amendment, and even the Supreme Court has affirmed that it’s fine, mostly because it’s always been done that way. I wish I could say “the Founding Fathers would be rolling in their graves” – but based on the first two entries in my timeline, it looks like they used this trick too. The hypocrisy runs deep with this one.

2025-11-28 21:59:42 UTC

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> Bitcoin's protocol gives a syntax for financial state transitions, but doesn't judge whether they are acceptable state transitions
It seems to me that bitcoin's protocol *does* judge whether a state transition is acceptable or not, e.g. in the tx_check.cpp file
For example, consider this snippet:
if (txout.nValue > MAX_MONEY)
return state.Invalid
That seems to imply that a transaction with an output that creates more than 21,000,000 btc is not acceptable